Free and fair? A challenge for the EU as Georgia and Ukraine gear up for elections by Kostanyan, Hrant & Vorobiov, Ievgen
  
Hrant Kostanyan is an Associate Research Fellow and Ievgen Vorobiov is an intern at CEPS. 
CEPS Commentaries offer concise, policy-oriented insights into topical issues in European affairs. 
The views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which they are associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2012 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ 
http://www.ceps.eu 
Free and fair? 
A Challenge for the EU 
as Georgia and Ukraine gear up for elections 
Hrant Kostanyan and Ievgen Vorobiov 
27 September 2012 
 
n an important test for democracy, Georgia and Ukraine will go to the polls for 
parliamentary elections on the 1st and 28th of October, respectively. The political leaders 
of these two Eastern Partnership countries have committed themselves to European 
values and principles – rhetorically. In reality, the promise of their colour revolutions is 
unrealised and they have shifted further towards authoritarianism, albeit following different 
paths in their respective post-revolution periods. Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili has 
championed a number of important reforms such as fighting criminality and improving 
public sector services. But democracy is in decline in the country, with an increasingly over-
bearing government, a weak parliament, non-independent judiciary and semi-free media. 
Unlike Saakashvili, who is still at the helm of Georgian politics, the protagonists of the 
Ukrainian revolution have either been imprisoned (Yulia Tymoshenko) or discredited 
(Viktor Yushchenko). President Yushchenko’s attempts to neutralise his former 
revolutionary ally Tymoshenko resulted in the electoral victory of Viktor Yanukovych in 
2010, who was quick to consolidate his reign.   
An uneven playing field  
The parliamentary elections in Georgia come at a critical juncture for the country, because 
the constitutional changes to be enforced in 2013 significantly increase the powers of the 
prime minister – effectively transforming this election into ‘king-maker’.  
If the Ukrainian president is to secure a constitutional majority in parliament, there are 
indications that Yanukovych will push for an amendment to enable presidential election by 
parliament rather than by direct popular vote. This would allow Yanukovych to abolish term 
limits altogether and also to avoid possible defeat in the 2015 presidential elections.  
Recent legislative amendments in both Georgia and Ukraine have laid the ground for the 
forthcoming parliamentary elections. The reintroduction of the mixed proportional and 
majoritarian representation system in both countries favours the incumbent parties, which 
are in a stronger position to secure the support of elected officials. Georgia’s electoral 
constituency map is also drawn up to blight the opposition. The Ukrainian Democratic Alliance 
for Reform and Svoboda (Freedom) opposition parties were not allocated a single 
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representative seat in any of the 225 electoral district commissions, and raising the threshold 
to 5% for parties to enter the Parliament is detrimental to all the smaller parties.  
The judiciary, administrative resources and the media 
Besides tampering with the electoral rules, Saakashvili and Yanukovych have utilised the 
entire state apparatus to their benefit. Their administrations have consistently manipulated 
key components of any democracy, namely the judiciary, the civil service and the media.  
Political competition in both countries has been stifled by selective justice at the behest of the 
government. In Georgia, the courts colluded in depriving the opposition leader, billionaire 
Bidzina Ivanishvili, of Georgian citizenship, after he announced his intention to stand for 
election. Only after special legal amendments had been passed was he allowed to take part in 
the elections. Georgian authorities also seized the opportunity to fine Ivanishvili for millions 
of dollars. In Ukraine, Tymoshenko and Yuri Lutsenko, the jailed opposition leaders, were 
denied the right to register for election by the Central Election Commission. A number of 
other Ukrainian opposition figures, such as Arsen Avakov, are in exile and thus unable to 
campaign. 
Both the Georgian and Ukrainian governments have made use of administrative and 
budgetary resources to manipulate the electoral choices of the population. Saakashvili’s 
‘libertarian’ government increased public spending for social security programmes ahead of 
the elections. Every Georgian family is expected to receive 1000 lari (about €470) to spend on 
utilities or education in the next four years. Similarly, in April 2012, Yanukovich signed 
amendments to the 2012 budget increasing social programme expenditure by 33 billion 
hryvnia (about €4 billion). Moreover, in both countries, the police services, local authorities 
and tax collectors have been instrumentalised to generate votes for the incumbents through 
intimidation, fines and arrests. 
The media is effectively gagged in both countries. Most television channels in Georgia are 
under government control, with the exception of TV channel Maestro. However, the 
government has made it difficult both for Maestro and Info 9, a channel owned by 
opposition leader Ivanishvili, to reach viewers. Newspapers and online media are relatively 
free; but the overwhelming majority of the population, especially in remote areas, relies on 
television for information about politics. As in Georgia, the Ukrainian opposition’s TVi 
channel, which has been critical of the government’s policies, was squeezed out of the cable 
networks, and its director persecuted. And when journalists attempted to protest against the 
authorities at the recent World Newspaper Forum in Kiev, they were brutally silenced by the 
guards of President Yanukovich. Furthermore, the amendments to the Criminal Code to 
recriminalise libel proposed by the ruling party are likely to further curb freedom of speech 
in Ukraine.  
Civic activism 
Civil society actors have played an important role in monitoring the electoral process and 
have called the authorities in Ukraine and Georgia to account, sometimes at great personal 
risk. Georgian civil society recovered somewhat after losing its prominent members to the 
government following the revolution; a number of NGOs united around the “It Affects You 
Too” campaign to monitor the electoral process and regularly exposed violations, especially 
in the application of electoral law. In Ukraine a coalition called Chesno! (Fair) has been 
analysing the electoral candidate lists and discloses information about them to the public.  
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What response from the EU? 
For years, the EU has been caught between the unwillingness of Georgian and Ukrainian 
authorities to pursue genuine democratic reforms and its own inability to send a clear 
message on the democratic backslide in these countries, although in recent months, EU 
leaders responsible for external relations have been more vocal in addressing this issue. The 
EU’s reaction to the changed law on the functioning of the Prosecutor’s office in Ukraine is 
indicative of the trend. However, EU disapprobation appears to have done little to 
discourage adverse trends in the run-up to the elections. In the face of various pre-election 
irregularities and suspected wrongdoings before and possibly during the elections, and 
assuming that the presidential coalitions will maintain their majorities, the EU should brace 
itself for a damning assessment by the OSCE’s election monitoring mission. If, indeed, the 
OSCE confirms that elections in both countries were neither (entirely) free nor fair, a difficult 
chapter of the EU’s relations with Georgia and Ukraine is likely to begin, probably spurred 
by street protests in both countries. 
In October and November, the EU Foreign Affairs Council will assess the elections in 
Georgia and Ukraine. If and when the scenario outlined above materialises, the EU may first 
have to further delay the ratification of the Association Agreement and the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area with Ukraine and slow down negotiations on the same 
agreements with Georgia. Second, the conclusion of a visa facilitation agreement with 
Ukraine, which has been held up so as not to influence the outcome of the elections, could be 
frozen for a longer period of time. The ongoing negotiations about visa liberalisation with 
Georgia might also be prolonged. Finally, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument’s conditionality could be triggered, with the EU decreasing the financial and 
technical assistance to both countries. While unpopular with certain member states of the 
EU, these moves will be necessary if the EU is serious about promoting certain values and 
principles in its relations with neighbouring countries. 
